

Message Text

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SUBJECT: DEPUTY MINISTER SEMENOV'S STATEMENT OF SEPTEMBER 20,
1974 (SALT TWO - 437)

THE FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT DELIVERED BY DEPUTY
MINISTER SEMENOV AT THE SALT TWO MEETING OF SEPTEMBER 20, 1974.

THE CONSIDERATIONS YOU SET FORTH TODAY WILL BE STUDIED
CAREFULLY FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE TASKS BEFORE US AT
THE NEGOTIATIONS.

FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE U.S. DELEGATION ON WORKING
OUT A NEW STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENT THE USSR DELE-
GATION HAS INSTRUCTIONS TO BE STRICTLY GUIDED BY THE RESULTS
OF THE DISCUSSION OF THIS PROBLEM AT THE SOVIET-AMERICAN SUM-
MIT MEETING JUNE 27-JULY 3, 1974. OUR INSTRUCTIONS ARE
FULLY IN ACCORD WITH THE UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN OUR STATES,
ARRIVED AT IN THE COURSE OF THAT MEETING AND RECORDED IN
THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE OF JULY 3, 1974.

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AS PROVIDED IN THE AFOREMENTIONED UNDERSTANDING, THE

SOVIET SIDE PROCEEDS FROM THE PREMISE THAT THE INTERIM AGREEMENT ON CERTAIN MEASURES WITH RESPECT TO THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS OF MAY 26, 1972, MUST BE FOLLOWED BY A NEW AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE U.S. ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. THE NEW AGREEMENT, WE BELIEVE, IS TO BE A MAJOR MILESTONE IN WINDING DOWN THE RACE IN STRATEGIC ARMS AND IN LIMITING THEM. WE DO NOT DOUBT THAT WORKING OUT AND CONCLUDING A NEW AGREEMENT WOULD NOT ONLY BE IN THE INTERESTS OF THE USSR AND THE U.S., BUT WOULD ALSO SERVE THE INTERESTS OF FURTHER EASING INTERNATIONAL TENSION AND THOSE OF UNIVERSAL PEACE. THE INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN THE USSR DELEGATION ARE BASED ON PRECISELY SUCH AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE AGREEMENT.

THE UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE U.S. ALSO SPECIFIES THAT THE NEW AGREEMENT MUST COVER THE PERIOD UNTIL 1985. THIS IS AN IMPORTANT FACTOR WHICH MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN THE COURSE OF THE WORK OF THE DELEGATIONS. WE NOW FACE THE PRACTICAL TASK OF SEEING AND DETERMINING HOW INDIVIDUAL ISSUES COMPRISING THE SUBJECT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS APPEAR IN THE LIGHT OF THE TERM ESTABLISHED FOR THE NEW AGREEMENT.

THE PREMISE, AGREED BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE U.S., THAT THE NEW AGREEMENT MUST COVER BOTH QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS MUST ALSO BE APPROACHED IN A CORRESPONDING MANNER. CLEARLY, A SEARCH FOR WAYS TO ACCOMPLISH THIS TASK MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE UNDERSTANDING ABOUT THE TERM OF THE NEW AGREEMENT.

THE USSR DELEGATION PROCEEDS FROM THE PREMISE THAT IN THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS BOTH DELEGATIONS WILL ORGANIZE THEIR WORK SO THAT NEGOTIATION OF THE NEW AGREEMENT COULD BE COMPLETED AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE, BEFORE THE EXPIRATION OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT, AS PROVIDED IN THE UNDERSTANDING REACHED AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL.

WITH A VIEW TO ACCOMPLISHING THE TASKS JUST REFERRED TO, IT APPEARS DESIRABLE, IN THE COURSE OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS, TO REACH AN UNDERSTANDING ABOUT THE BASIC FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES

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OF THE NEW AGREEMENT, ITS POSSIBLE SCOPE AND STRUCTURE.

THE USSR DELEGATION HAS ALREADY STATED AND WOULD LIKE TO REAFFIRM THAT IT IS PREPARED TO USE ALL OPPORTUNITIES FOR AN ACTIVE SEARCH FOR WAYS TO WORK OUT AN AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS ON A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE BASIS. WE ARE PREPARED TO CONDUCT THE NEGOTIATIONS IN SUCH A MANNER AS TO EXPLORE THE WAYS AND APPROACHES REQUIRED

IN THIS CONTEXT THAT LEAD TOWARD ACCOMPLISHING THE TASK OF WORKING OUT THE NEW AGREEMENT.

EXPLORATION OF THE OPPORTUNITIES REFERRED TO HERE PRE-SUPPOSES CONSIDERATION OF QUESTIONS ALONG A BROAD RANGE AND IN APPROPRIATE PERSPECTIVE. IT WOULD, OF COURSE, SERVE THE INTERESTS OF OUR TASK IF THIS WORK WERE CONDUCTED IN A SUFFICIENTLY PURPOSEFUL MANNER.

MR. AMBASSADOR, AS WE UNDERSTAND YOUR STATEMENT AT THE SEPTEMBER 18, 1974 MEETING, OUR DELEGATIONS EVIDENTLY HOLD A COMMON VIEW ON WHAT OUR WORK AT THIS STAGE IN GENEVA IS TO CONSIST OF, I.E. TO SEARCH FOR WAYS OF ACHIEVING A NEW AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE U.S. ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS FOR THE PERIOD UNTIL 1985, AS PROVIDED IN THE SOVIET-AMERICAN COMMUNIQUE OF JULY 3, 1974.

IT IS QUITE OBVIOUS THAT IN EXPLORING WAYS LEADING TO A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE RESOLUTION OF THE QUESTIONS INVOLVED IN WORKING OUT SUCH AN AGREEMENT, THE DELEGATIONS MUST AT ALL TIMES BE STRICTLY GUIDED BY THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY AND INADMISSIBILITY OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE.

THIS PRINCIPLE IS OF FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE IN APPROACHING THE TASK OF LIMITING STRATEGIC ARMS AND HAS DEMONSTRATED ITS VIABILITY IN THE COURSE OF THESE SOVIET-AMERICAN NEGOTIATIONS. IT SERVES AS A RELIABLE GUIDEPOST IN THE SEARCH FOR CORRECT SOLUTIONS IN THE AREA OF STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION. THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY AND INADMISSIBILITY OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE IS CLEARLY RECORDED IN THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA OF MAY 29, 1972, AS WELL AS IN OTHER JOINT SOVIET-AMERICAN DOCUMENTS.

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THERE IS NO DOUBT, HOWEVER, THAT IN WORKING OUT THE NEW AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, THE TASK OF THE DELEGATIONS IS NOT MERELY TO CONFIRM THIS PRINCIPLE, BUT ALSO TO FIND WAYS OF CONSISTENTLY EMBODYING IT IN THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT.

A CORRECT APPLICATION OF THIS PRINCIPLE AND ITS EMBODIMENT IN THE PROVISIONS OF THE NEW AGREEMENT BEING NEGOTIATED ON QUESTIONS OF LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS IS POSSIBLE ONLY ON CONDITION OF OBJECTIVELY TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM OF LIMITING SUCH ARMS, OF TAKING INTO ACCOUNT ALL OF THE ASPECTS OF THE STRATEGIC SITUATION WHICH BEAR ON THE CONTENT OF THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS. YOU WILL AGREE, I BELIEVE, THAT THE QUESTION OF REDUCTIONS,

WHICH YOU TOUCHED ON IN TODAY'S STATEMENT CAN ALSO BE POSED CORRECTLY ONLY FROM THE STANDPOINT OF THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY AND INADMISSIBILITY OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE.

THE QUESTION ALSO ARISES WHETHER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO SPEAK OF ENSURING EQUAL SECURITY AND INADMISSIBILITY OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE IF, IN WORKING OUT THE NEW AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, ONLY SOME PORTION OF THE OVERALL PICTURE COMPRISING THE STRATEGIC SITUATION WERE CONSIDERED, OR IF THE FACTORS WHICH INFLUENCE IT WERE TO BE IGNORED? UNDER SUCH CONDITIONS ONE COULD HARDLY EXPECT THAT A VIABLE AND MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT COULD BE WORKED OUT SUCCESSFULLY.

CONSEQUENTLY, DURING CONSIDERATION OF POSSIBLE WAYS OF EMBODYING IN THE NEW AGREEMENT THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY AND INADMISSIBILITY OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE, THE TASK CONSISTS OF TAKING INTO ACCOUNT ALL ACTUAL FACTS AND ACTIONS WHICH AFFECT THE STRATEGIC SITUATION DURING THE PERIOD COVERED BY THE NEW AGREEMENT. IN OTHER WORDS, ANY POSSIBLE SOLUTION TO EACH ISSUE IN THE AGREEMENT MUST ABOVE ALL BE CONSIDERED AND WEIGHED FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF WHETHER IT TRULY CORRESPONDS TO THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY AND INADMISSIBILITY OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE.

OF COURSE, ALL THIS WILL DEMAND FROM BOTH SIDES CREA-
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TIVE EXPLORATION, A CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH AND AN OPEN MIND DURING CONSIDERATION OF THE RELEVANT QUESTIONS BEFORE THE DELEGATIONS.

MR. AMBASSADOR,

GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE SPSU L.I. BREZHNEV DECLARED THAT IF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES ADHERES TO THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUAL SECURITY AND RENUNCIATION OF ATTEMPTS AT OBTAINING UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE, THEN IT WILL ALWAYS FIND THE SOVIET UNION A CONSCIENTIOUS AND ACTIVE PARTNER IN SUCH AN IMPORTANT CAUSE AS LIMITATION AND REDUCTION OF STRATEGIC ARMS. JOHNSON

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